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ABSTRACT
When security updates are not installed, or installed slowly, end
users are at an increased risk for harm. To improve security, soft-
ware designers have endeavored to remove the user from the soft-
ware update loop. However, user involvement in software updates
remains necessary; not all updates are wanted, and required reboots
can negatively impact users. We used a multi-method approach to
collect interview, survey, and computer log data from 37 Windows
7 users. We compared what the users think is happening on their
computers (interview and survey data), what users want to happen
on their computer (interview and survey data), and what was actu-
ally going on (log data). We found that 28 out of our 37 participants
had a misunderstanding about what was happening on their com-
puter, and that over half of the participants could not execute their
intentions for computer management.
1. INTRODUCTION
Home computer software is rarely released problem-free; most
companies release a number of software updates to fix bugs in the
software and add in new features. Microsoft alone released over
300 distinct software updates in the first three months of 2013. Se-
curity updates are particularly important because they are one of
the primary mechanisms for protecting home computers from ma-
licious software that leverages known vulnerabilities. The majority
of computer compromises result from vulnerabilities for which a
security update is available but has not yet been installed [16, 19].
Timely installation of security updates can protect users from the
most common attacks [19].
Since installing security updates is so important for computer
safety, many software companies have worked to find ways to im-
prove end-user compliance and increase the number of fully up-
dated systems. For example, each successive version of Microsoft
Windows has had additional features to automate the installation of
software updates with less human involvement [10]. Current soft-
ware updates (and Microsoft Windows Updates in particular) have
largely removed the need for human decisions. They default to au-
tomatically downloading and installing updates in the background,
and forcing users to reboot (if needed).
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
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However, not all security technologies can completely remove
the human from the decision-making process [1]. Cranor assem-
bled a useful framework for reasoning about when it is advisable
to keep a ‘human in the loop’ [5]. This framework is relevant to
software updates because updates cannot be installed completely
without user intervention for three reasons: 1) occasionally, an up-
date will introduce a new bug into the system, and users will want
to postpone installing that update, 2) an update may introduce or re-
move features which impact user activities causing users to want to
avoid installing the update, and 3) many updates require rebooting
the computer to install, which is highly disruptive of user activities.
Therefore, users need to be kept informed and given options during
the update process. Software update systems have tried to accomo-
date users by finding an appropriate balance between forcing users
to install updates to improve security, and giving them appropriate
choices.
We conducted a multi-method user study to better understand
how people make decisions about software updates that are so cru-
cial to security. With each subject, we conducted semi-structured
interviews to understand how the subject views software updates,
had him or her take a survey to provide more structured opinions,
and collected log data about update installation from his or her
computer. In this paper, we focus primarily on subjects’ decisions
and behavior for Microsoft Windows updates. We find that over
half of our subjects were not aware of what their computer’s soft-
ware update settings were or when the software updates were being
installed. The majority of users’ computers behaved in a way con-
trary to the user’s intentions. However, many of these computers
were also more secure than the user intended. This means that im-
proving usability of software updates might not lead to improved
security, which has interesting implications for the design of soft-
ware update systems.
2. INTEGRATING HUMANS INTO
SECURITY
Security failures are often seen as a human problem rather than
a technological one. For example, West [24] wrote, “The most
elegant and intuitively designed interface does not improve security
if users ignore warnings, choose poor settings, or unintentionally
subvert corporate policies.”
In the workplace, computer and information security is the joint
responsibility of end users and system administrators, but end users
are often seen as “inherently insecure” [1, 11]. With the rise of dis-
cretionary computer usage and “bring your own device,” end users
bear more of the responsibility for the security of their many de-
vices in and out of the workplace. Such users are their own system
administrators, whether they know it or not, and how to best sup-
port them is the subject of much research.
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Users are perceived as the weak link for several reasons:
• The expectations placed on end users with respect to man-
aging the security of their computers are unrealistic; users
cannot be expected to think like system administrators [2]
• Security only becomes apparent to end users when some-
thing has already gone wrong [27]
• Security is not users’ first priority, and given a choice, they
will choose the insecure option if it gets them closer to their
goals [8]
• When users make mistakes, it makes the job of system ad-
ministrators that much harder [8]
System designers frequently attempt to either nudge [20] or force
users into making secure decisions. The designer might try to make
security the user’s top priority by creating mechanisms that prevent
them from completing any action until the security aspects have
been taken care of. The system might make the security-related
actions so easy and unobtrusive that they can do whatever is neces-
sary as part of their normal workflow or primary task (path of least
resistance). Or, it might remove all responsibility and ability to act
from the user by completely automating the security aspects of the
system, so users cannot make the wrong choice [26].
However, it isn’t feasible to completely automate security. Hu-
man capabilities are frequently necessary for the task at hand [22].
A “default” level of security is not appropriate for all users in all
situations [9]. And automatic security cannot be used when config-
uration decisions must be made, or when automation is too “restric-
tive, inconvenient, expensive, or slow” [9]. Cranor [5] advocates
that system designers should explicitly design for both automation
and user responsibility for security by identifying which security
aspects of the system cannot be automated and are likely to fail
due to user intervention. System designers should provide better
support to the users in those circumstances.
Software designers need to be aware that there is a tradeoff be-
tween visibility and intrusiveness. In circumstances when the user
must remain “in the loop”, communication between the system and
the user is crucial, and it is the role of the software designer respon-
sible for making sure the software is secure to figure out where this
communication must take place [5]. Relegating security to “Ad-
vanced” tabs and burying it in menus is one way to (intentionally
or unintentionally) ensure that the user retains the defaults. [9]
How that communication might best be accomplished is the sub-
ject of much usable security research. One of the core values of
usability is “walk up and use” interfaces that do not require special
learning or expertise; however, this approach may result in priori-
tizing the usability aspects of the system over the security aspects,
because security may be more complicated than a “walk up and
use” interface can communicate [12]. Recommendations to im-
prove the usability of the communication between the system and
the user are often assumed to also improve security, because users
will be more involved, but this is not always the case.
To further complicate matters, end users often delegate the re-
sponsibility for the security of their systems, to technology, other
people, organizations, or institutions [7]. Delegating responsibility
to technology—to the system itself—is like ‘set it and forget it’ se-
curity: do it once, and never have think about it again. Once this
has taken place, security becomes invisible, and is not often revis-
ited. This means that the system keeps going with the past settings
indefinitely. Policies like this are too rigid, because an invisible
policy can’t adapt to users’ changing needs and circumstances [8].
Software updates are a particularly interesting case for studying
how to include humans in security systems. From a security per-
spective, quickly installing security updates is the correct behavior,
and can often be safely initiated without user intervention. How-
ever, many updates require that the computer reboot to complete
installation, necessitating human involvement, and making the au-
tomated update process visible to users who may not understand
why it is necessary [21].
3. SOFTWARE UPDATES IMPROVE
SECURITY
Updating software is an important part of keeping a computer se-
cure, and keeping all software up-to-date will protect a user against
the most common security exploits. Symantec has data showing
that the majority of computers are compromised using vulnerabili-
ties where an update is available, but has not yet been applied [19].
The majority of web exploits use the top twenty vulnerabilities, all
of which have available updates [19]. Likewise, Microsoft observes
that all of the vulnerabilities exploited by the most popular exploit
kit have available updates [16].
It is important to update software as soon as possible after a secu-
rity update is released. Updates correcting security vulnerabilities
are released an average of 1.2 months after an exploit for the vul-
nerability seen in the wild [15]. However, exploits released before a
vulnerability becomes public knowledge (zero-day vulnerabilities)
are used to attack a relatively small number of computer systems.
Once a zero-day vulnerability becomes public knowledge the num-
ber of exploits using it increases 183–85,000 times and the number
of attacks increases 2–100,000 times [3]. Likely for this reason,
60% of Microsoft’s vulnerabilities are made public knowledge the
same day as the update correcting the vulnerability is released [15],
enabling users to protect themselves before exploits become read-
ily available. For these and other security reasons, the faster the
user updates their system the less likely they will be vulnerable to
new attacks.
While updating quickly is good for security, all updates cannot
be completely automated because they impact end users’ work-
flows [21]. Many software updates include new, unwanted features.
Some software updates introduce new bugs or incompatibilities.
Rebooting interrupts users from their work. And many users prefer
to “not fix what ain’t broken.”
There has been limited investigation into what motivates users
to update or not update software on their computer. LaRose et al.
surveyed undergraduate students about their online safety behav-
iors and beliefs. They found that people who feel like online safety
is their personal responsibility are more likely to want to perform
safe online behaviors [13, 14]. They also found that coping ef-
ficacy beliefs were correlated with intention to perform software
updates [13]. These studies are based on self-report data, and are
unable to examine whether subjects actually undertake their stated
behaviors.
3.1 Windows Update
In this paper, we focus on Windows Update, a software update
service provided for free by Microsoft. It began as a website that
Windows 95 users had to visit to find out whether operating sys-
tem updates were available. A new “Critical Update Installation
Tool”, introduced with Windows 98, included automatic checking
for updates, and it also notified users about critical updates which
they had to then manually retrieve and install. In 2000, Windows
ME shipped with “Automatic Updates”, a tool that could automati-
cally download and optionally install software updates. Automatic
installation of updates became the default with Windows XP SP2,
andWindows Vista began automatically installing both updates cat-
egorized as “important” (including ‘security’ and ‘critical’ updates
2
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Figure 1: The Windows Update process. Ovals represent user actions, diamonds decisions, and rectangles computer behavior. This
diagram was created based on prior update work by Gkantsidis et al., and experimentation using a Virtual Machine with Microsoft
Windows 7 Service Pack 1 installed.
as well as reliability improvements), and also “recommended” up-
dates [25].
The result of this evolution, the Windows Update software used
in Windows 7, demonstrates the compromise Microsoft software
designers made between automating the update process for the safety
of users and giving users responsibility for their computer use. As
shown in Figure 1, by default each update in Windows Update goes
through three stages: an install scheduling, a time for manual in-
stall, and an automatic installation.
Stage 1: (left blue box) The computer automatically checks for
updates, downloads them, schedules them to be installed at 3am the
next morning, and then notifies the user that updates are available
to be installed. The notification appears temporarily in the bottom
right of the screen, and a gold shield is added to the “Shut down”
button on the start menu.
Stage 2: (green middle box) The computer waits silently for the
user to manually initiate the install process. This gives the user
the opportunity to take responsibility for their updates. Users may
manually install updates by opening the Windows Update program
and selecting “Install updates.” If a reboot is needed, the user is
notified by a dialog with a postpone option. However, the dialog
only reminds the user, it does not compel a reboot.
Stage 3: (red right box) The computer starts installing updates
automatically at 3am or the first time the computer is turned on af-
ter 3am. If any update requires a reboot the computer presents the
user with a dialog warning that the reboot will happen in 10 min-
utes. The dialog countdown timer has options to “Reboot now” or
“Postpone”; the user cannot escape the countdown completely. If
the user does nothing, the computer will immediately reboot. How-
ever, if the user chooses to intervene during the 10 minute interval,
they can “Restart now” which causes an immediate reboot of the
system, or “Postpone” for an additional 10 minutes, 1 hour, or 4
hours. This stage automates security decisions, removing the hu-
man from the loop.
The design of Windows Update is a compromise between fully
automating updates and giving users full responsibility for updates,
and it has been successful at increasing security. After the release
of Windows XP SP2, Gkantsidis et al. observed that only 5% of
SP1 users had fully updated computers, but 90% of SP2 users had
fully updated computers. They also observed that 80% of SP2 users
downloaded the latest update within two days of release [10]. In
2011, 66% of Windows users (all versions) were completely up-to-
date, and 84% had at least one of the three most recent updates [16].
4. METHODS
Software updates are an instance where security system design-
ers have mostly, but not completely, removed humans from security
decision-making. To better understand user decision-making about
software updates, we undertook a multi-method study that included
semi-structured interviews, an online survey, and log-data analy-
sis. This allowed us to measure both users’ beliefs and impressions
about what their computers were doing, and what their computers
were actually doing.
4.1 Participants and Protocol
To study software updates, we wanted a population that doesn’t
have formal security or computer administration training, but still
thinks enough about issues around updates that they have relatively
well-formed opinions. We chose to study graduate students at a
large research university in the Midwest of the United States. Grad-
uate students are a group of computer users who are mostly non-
technical, are responsible for maintaining their own computers, and
depend on their computers for their work.
We sent an email through the University Registrar to a random
sample of 1000 graduate students, excluding Math and Engineering
students, asking for volunteers to participate in the study. Ninety-
five people took a screening survey to ensure that they were Win-
dows 7 users (so we could collect log data) and did not have any
formal training in computer management, IT, or system adminis-
tration. For this study, we chose to go deep into a single system’s
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updates, and chose the most popular, and most commonly exploited
end-user system (Windows) to focus on. Thirty-seven people who
were eligible came to our lab to participate, and brought their laptop
running Windows 7 with them. Three of these subjects were Mac
users running Windows in a virtual machine. Participants ranged
in age from 21 to 57 with an average age of 31; Seventeen were
male, and twenty were female. These demographics approximately
match those of the larger graduate student population.
After informed consent, the study consisted of three parts: a brief
survey, Windows log data collection, and a semi-structured inter-
view. While one member of the research team administered the
survey and interview, another member used a custom Powershell
script to collect setting and log data on the subject’s laptop. Sub-
jects were given the option of observing the data collection. This
study was approved by our university’s IRB.
4.2 Three Types of Data
We collected three different datasets from each participant: a
set of survey responses, log data from their Windows 7 laptop,
and a transcribed, semi-structured interview. We began by ana-
lyzing each type of data separately. Then, using an ID number
and pseudonym assigned to each subject, we re-combined the three
data sources to compare subject responses and behavior across data
sources. This analysis structure ensured that we accurately under-
stood the meaning of each separate type of data before comparing
attitude, recall, and behavior across data sources.
4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
System designers have made most software updates highly au-
tomated and relatively invisible to end users. Users don’t spend
much time thinking about software updates. This poses a challenge
for conducting interviews: how can we get subjects to talk about
past experiences and reveal how they think about updates? And
how can we avoid having subjects think about updates too deeply
during the interview – and change their opinions, which would lead
to invalid data?
After a series of pilot tests, we decided to use three interviewing
techniques: free-listing, hypothetical scenarios, and recollection of
specific past instances.
We began by asking participants to complete a free-listing ac-
tivity [4]: write down as many examples as came to mind for the
prompt, “things that can happen if the software on your computer
is too old or out of date”. We then read each example and asked the
participant to discuss his or her response further. Free-listing al-
lows us to explore the semantic domain of updates; that is, it helps
the subject to think through and explain the range of activities and
concerns that are relevant to a discussion of software updates. The
use of a non-specific prompt, reading items back to the subject,
and using the items as semantic cues to discuss past instances help
subjects to fully explore the topic of software updates [4].
Next, we presented subjects with a series of five hypothetical
scenarios paired with probing questions; we wanted the participant
to do most of the talking so that we could uncover their attitudes,
beliefs, and mental models about updates. The scenarios involved
being prompted to restart an internet browser mid-task, seeing that
a large number of urgent Windows updates were available, reading
a news article about a virus, a software program that costs money
to update, and a slow computer with lots of warnings. Hypothetical
scenarios are effective methods of learning how subjects conceptu-
alize their decisions relate to software updates [23].
Finally, throughout the interview, we regularly asked subjects to
recall specific past instances of software update decisions. By ask-
ing to recall specific instances, subjects provide more details and
are better able to recall information that influenced their decision-
making at the time. Recalling specific instances provides data that
is more likely to represent broad decision-making patterns than ask-
ing subjects to describe general patterns of past behavior [18].
Analysis: After transcribing and anonymizing the interviews, we
performed a bottom-up, inductive coding. We started with an ini-
tial list of themes identified by the research team, and expanded
the codes as each of us separately read through transcripts. Dur-
ing this period, members of the team met frequently to discuss and
revise the codes. Themes identified include “negative update ex-
periences”, “attitudes toward delaying updates”, and “why updates
are important.”
As we created each code, we examined other subjects to check
for representativeness and identify which traits were common across
subjects. We also explicitly looked for negative cases: cases that
share most of the pattern but are explicitly missing one or two key
pieces.
When coding was complete, we summarized the data into a ma-
trix that displayed themes by participant [17]. This matrix allowed
us to understand each individual’s perspective on updates by read-
ing down the column that summarizes their responses. We then
compared the summary data matrix to original interviews to verify
the correctness of each summary, check for the meaning of outliers,
verify surprises, specifically look for evidence for negative cases,
and try to prevent researcher confirmation bias in our data. [18].
This process provides confidence that our summaries are valid rep-
resentations of participant views as expressed in the interviews.
4.2.2 Survey
We used an in-lab computer survey to ask structured, closed-
ended questions. A survey allowed us to ensure that all participants
were asked the same set of factual and opinion-based questions in
a consistent, comparable manner. In addition to background in-
formation such as subject demographics, computer skills, and in-
stalled software, we also asked subjects for their current under-
standing of the state of software updates on their computer. This
includes whether automatic updates were enabled and whether up-
dates were usually installed manually or automatically. Questions
were written following the guidance of Dillman [6] and were pre-
tested to ensure subjects understood the questions the same way the
researchers did.
Analysis: We generated descriptive statistics for each subject, as
well as extracting the specific questions about the user’s knowledge
of current state of the automatic updates setting, their belief about
whether updates are installed manually or automatically, and their
belief about the timing of install. The full survey instrument is
available in the Appendix.
4.2.3 Windows Logs
The Windows operating system, along with many Windows ser-
vices, records information about system events in log files which
contain detailed records of system and user behavior. Our Power-
shell script collected the current Windows Update settings, which
allowed us to determine whether updates were turned off, set to no-
tify the user before download, or set to install automatically without
user intervention (default behavior). The script did not collect any
personally identifiable information.
We also collected a list of installed updates from the Windows
Update API, and a copy of all Windows Update log files which
provided detailed event information from the last several months of
use. This allowed us to calculate the time between when an update
had been downloaded and when it was installed, which is impor-
tant because this is the part of the update process that the user has
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the most control over—i.e., when the update is installed and when
the computer reboots to finish installing an update (if necessary).
One limitation of this method is that the detailed logs represented
between 1 and 17 months (average of 6) of usage data depending
on how often the participant had been using the machine.
Analysis: We first looked at each update separately. We lim-
ited our log analysis to updates which were associated with a Mi-
crosoft Knowledge Base (KB) number, which allowed us to link
update events across log files. We marked the update as proactively
installed by the user if it was installed before 3am1 the morning
following the update’s download. We marked it as automatically
installed by Windows Update if it was installed after 3am. Then
we aggregated all updates for a user: did the user always install
proactively (100%), usually (> 50%) install proactively, usually au-
tomatic install, or always automatic install?
4.3 Combining Data for Analysis
In order to compare user attitudes, user beliefs, and user behav-
ior, we constructed a data matrix that combined data from all three
sources of information [17]. For each subject, we created entries
on three topics: general updates, the automatic updates setting, and
the timing of update installs. For each of these topics, we included
a row of data from each of the three data sources: the subject’s
attitude and understanding of the topic summarized from the inter-
views, the subjects current beliefs from the survey, and the subject’s
past behavior summarized from the log data.
After creating the combined data matrix, we again examined our
data to ensure validity [18]. All members of the research team
participated in looking for patterns across subjects, checking for
negative cases, verifying summaries with original source data, and
including footnotes and caveats for our summaries.
For each of the three topics, this data matrix allowed us to di-
rectly compare a subject’s understanding, the subject’s belief, and
the subject’s behavior on their computer. In checking through this
data matrix, however, we noticed that subjects’ understanding and
beliefs were not straightforward. Rather, each subject’s understand-
ing and beliefs could be separated into two: the subject’s under-
standing of what his or her computer is currently doing, and the
subject’s intention for what he or she would like the computer to
be doing. Therefore, we split these understanding rows in two, and
verified each piece with the source data.
5. FINDINGS
We used our interview data and our survey data to characterize
two things: what the user thought the computer was doing, and
what the user wanted the computer to do. We then compared these
two perceptions with the log data from that user’s computer to de-
termine if they matched. That is, we compared user’s stated under-
standing of what their computer was doing with log data and set-
tings that indicated what the computer actually did, to see whether
users understood what was happening on their computer. Then we
compared each user’s stated intentions — what they wanted their
computer to be doing — to the log data and settings to determine
whether they were actually able to make the computer do what they
wanted.
5.1 Understanding Software Updates
Many of our subjects misunderstood what their computers were
doing regarding software updates. Twenty-eight of the 37 sub-
jects (78%) had at least one inconsistency between what the subject
1One user had a scheduled install time setting of 4am, all other
users had the default of 3am, for simplicity we always refer to this
time using the default of 3am or “overnight”.
Consistent Inconsistent
Changed Setting 4 On, but thinks Off 4
Default Setting 8 Off, but thinks On 2
Download but not Install 5
Notify, but not Download 14
Total 12 Total 25
Table 1: Misunderstandings of Automatic Updates (Number of
Subjects)
thought their computer was doing and what the log data indicated it
was doing. There are two topics that subjects had misunderstand-
ings about: the Windows Update setting about whether to install
updates automatically, and how quickly updates were installed.
Automatic Updates Setting.
Automatic update settings were a prevalent source of misunder-
standing for our subjects. There are four possible settings in Win-
dows Update: 1) On, the default setting where Windows automat-
ically downloads and installs updates according to the process de-
scribed in Section 3.1 (31 participants had this setting), 2) Down-
load available updates but do not install them (0 participants), 3)
Notify the user when updates are available, but do not automati-
cally download or install them (4 participants), and 4) Off, where
Windows Update must be manually run for anything to happen (2
participants).
Among our 37 subjects, 25 had some form of inconsistency be-
tween what they stated they thought their computer’s auto-update
setting was, and the recorded settings on the computer (See Ta-
ble 1). Of these, five subjects were close to correct: they thought
that their computer automatically downloaded updates and prompted
them to install. While this is true, their actual setting automatically
installs the downloaded updates at 3am if the user hasn’t already
installed them; these five subjects frequently installed their updates
proactively so rarely encountered the 3am automatic install.
This leaves 20 subjects who had an inconsistency in their under-
standing of their auto-update setting. Four subjects believed that
their auto-updates had been turned off, when in reality they had
the default, secure setting of automatically installing updates. Two
subjects believed the opposite; they thought they had auto-updates
turned on, but auto-updates had been disabled on their computer2.
The remaining 14 subjects expressed a belief that automatic up-
dates only notify them about available updates but do not install
them. However, these 14 subjects all had the default setting of au-
tomatically installing updates. For example, Justin3 told us “I mean
it usually prompts me when there is an update to be installed, but I
don’t know if that means auto-update or not.” His survey answers
also indicated that he thought that Windows notified him, but did
not install updates.
As a comparison case, 12 subjects were completely consistent in
their understanding of auto-updates. Eight had the default setting,
and correctly understood that setting as automatically downloading
and installing updates. Rachel said, “ I guess my current belief is
that the operating system doesn’t give you a choice about updating
things, it just does it for you.” And four subjects had intentionally
changed the setting to Notify Before Download (i.e., the computer
notifies the user that new updates are available but does not down-
2One of these subjects may be running a third-party updating sys-
tem designed for pirated Windows systems.
3All subject names have been anonymized.
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Figure 2: Perceived Times When Updates Can Be Installed
load or install them), and also correctly understood their change.
In our sample of non-technical computer users, six subjects’ com-
puters did not have the default auto-updates setting, Scheduled In-
stall, in which software updates are automated as much as possible.
Two of these subjects didn’t understand the setting and thought they
were still on. However, the remaining four subjects correctly un-
derstood that their computers would not automatically install up-
dates. An additional 14 subjects, who had the default setting of
Scheduled Install, believed that they were only notified about up-
dates and that no updates were installed automatically. These find-
ings indicate that many misunderstandings exist regarding whether
users are updating Windows, and that sometimes these misunder-
standings mean that updates are not installed.
Timing of Update Installation.
The timing of updates is another source of inconsistency between
subjects’ stated intention and log data. Common security advice is
that software updates, and particularly security updates, should be
installed as quickly as possible to protect against in-the-wild ex-
ploits and zero-day vulnerabilities [19]. However, installing soft-
ware updates usually interrupts what the user is doing on their com-
puter, and often requires a severely disruptive reboot [21].
In our log data analysis, we characterized each update as ei-
ther proactive or automatic depending on if the user proactively
installed the update, or if Windows automatically installed the up-
date. Each subject, then, made a series of choices that either re-
sulted in the subject installing most of their updates proactively, or
mostly allowing Windows to automatically install.
However, subject understanding of update timing doesn’t exactly
match this characterization. Instead, we found three timing cat-
egories for when updates might be installed (See Figure 2). The
fastest possible update installation happens when a user is notified
about an available update, and interrupts what they are doing to im-
mediately and manually install the update. An intermediate timing
occurs when a user is notified about an update, but doesn’t interrupt
their work to install it immediately. Instead, they wait until a con-
venient time to manually install the update. Both these categories
involve manual installation, though some users may not find con-
venient times and end up with Windows automatically installing
some updates. Finally, the slowest timing that actually results in
the update being installed corresponds with the forced timing, and
occurs when the user waits too long and the computer automatically
installs the update and reboots the computer.
This difference in technical coding and user understanding poses
an analysis challenge: when a subject indicates that they install
their updates “when convenient,” how do we characterize whether
their behavior is consistent with their understanding? To address
this, we first looked at the logs for whether most of an individual
subject’s updates were automatic or manually installed. If updates
were mostly automatic, then that is a clear disconnect from the sub-
ject’s stated understanding of installing when convenient; since the
automatic install happens as pre-specified times, it is unlikely that
that is happening “when convenient.”
However, if the subject mostly installed updates manually, then
Consistent Inconsistent
When Convenient 8 Want Convenience, but Automatic 8
Want Convenience, but Proactive 6
Wait till Forced 6 Thinks Delay, Installs Proactively 2
Wants Only AV updates 2
Turned Auto-updates Off 1
Total 14 Total 19
Table 2: Inconsistencies in Timing of Update (Number of Sub-
jects). We excluded four subjects from the table due to insuffi-
cient information.
this could be consistent with a desire for convenience (if they waited
until it was convenient to install and reboot), or it could be incon-
sistent (if they interrupted themselves to install the updates). Since
whether or not a subject was interrupted is entirely in the opin-
ion of that subject, we looked to the survey data for guidance on
how to categorize them. On the survey, we asked each subject how
likely they would be to interrupt themselves to install Windows up-
dates. Consistent with traditional interpretations of similar Likert
scale survey questions [6], we took this question to represent the
subject’s memories of whether they were frequently interrupting
their work to install updates. If they answered “Likely” or “Very
Likely”, then we took this as inconsistent with their stated desire
for convenience. Any other answer was considered consistent.
Results: Nineteen of our 37 subjects expressed a desire about the
timing of updates that was inconsistent with the log data on their
computer. Of these, ten subjects installed updates more quickly
than their stated intention, and nine subjects installed updates more
slowly. (See Table 2 for counts.) Four subjects had insufficient
interview data to accurately judge their desires.
Twenty-two subjects stated that they wanted to install updates
manually at a convenient time; however, eight of them never ac-
tually got around to running the updates and the computer ended
up automatically installing the update — which means the subjects
installed updates slower than intended. Six subjects actually inter-
rupted their work and installed the updates very quickly. On the
diagram in Figure 2, all 22 of these subjects’ stated intentions were
to install in that middle range of timing — when convenient. Eight
actually installed at that time; eight actually installed when forced
(to the right), and six actually installed immediately (to the left).
Two subjects stated that they usually delay updates, particularly
updates that require a restart. These subjects, however, usually in-
stalled updates very quickly according to the logs. Three subjects
said they only do updates labeled “urgent“; two of them success-
fully installed all updates quickly, but one subject had auto-updates
turned off and didn’t install any updates.
When a subject has an inconsistency about when updates are
being installed, this isn’t a technical misunderstanding. Subjects
aren’t misunderstanding how the computer is working. Rather, they
are misunderstanding their own behavior. Such a misunderstand-
ing is important because it can form the basis for further decisions,
such as "is my computer secure?" But since it is not a technical
misunderstanding, greater education will not necessarily solve it.
Difficulty Understanding Updates.
As indicated by the many inconsistencies mentioned above, many
of our subjects misunderstood what was happening on their com-
puters. In examining our interview data, we found two reasons they
were having problems.
First, the computer wasn’t very clear about what it is doing and
6
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when it is doing it. Many subjects talked about how it was difficult
to understand what was going on. Nicole, for example, could not
tell whether she permitted her computer to automatically update or
not:
Actually I didn’t know that I clicked yes for auto up-
dating. It just popped up. So, that’s why I know about
the auto updating. And other stuff, I didn’t know that I
clicked yes for auto updating or something like that.
In the interview, she indicated that she thought it was important
to install urgent and critical updates, and in the survey she indicated
that she thought her updates were automatically installed. How-
ever, her computer actually had automatic updates turned off.
Second, even when our subjects tried to look at settings and dig
deeper, they found most of the settings to be confusing and difficult
to use. Matt said that he “[doesn’t] even know where I’d go to do
that.” Will wanted to turn off automatic updates:
But I know I played around with some of the settings
on my computer so that it wouldn’t automatically up-
date everything. Because it would just slow down my
computer to a crawl. And several computers that I’ve
had, it makes it harder when you’re trying to get a task
done.
However, Will’s computer still had the default setting and all up-
dates released had been installed. Furthermore, most of his updates
were automatic installs, rather than being installed manually.
Many of these misunderstandings stem from design choices that
try to remove the need for humans to make decisions about software
updates. Windows Update has automated as much as possible and
moved many updates actions into background, invisible processes.
That automation made it difficult for many of our subjects to un-
derstand what was happening on their computer at any time, and
even whether updates were being installed at all. Additionally, to
discourage users from changing settings, Windows Update makes
it difficult for users to find the settings in the first place. So even
if our subjects did want to change the settings, they couldn’t figure
out how. Removing the subjects’ decision-making ability had the
side effect of also making it difficult for them to learn about updates
and understand what their computers were doing.
5.2 Intentions and Security
In addition to describing their current understanding, our sub-
jects also described what they wanted to be doing about software
updates. Did our subjects intend to put off updates because they
felt like updates weren’t important, or did they intend to install
them immediately but ended up delaying indefinitely? Here, we
describe whether these stated intentions match what was actually
happening on the computer. Mismatches between intentions and
behavior indicate usability problems, or what would change if we
made software updates easier to understand and use.
For this analysis, we consider installing updates to be secure, and
installing them sooner is more secure than waiting and installing
them later. While users may have good reasons to choose to be less
secure, we focus primarily on the security consequences of those
choices.
Two subjects provided short answers during their interviews and
did not clearly describe their intentions for what they wanted their
computers to be doing. Therefore, these subjects were removed
from this analysis of intentions.
Consistent Inconsistent
Notify but not Auto-Install 3 More Secure 12
Not urgent, so wait till Forced 3 Less Secure 9
Always install Immediately 8
Total 14 Total 21
Table 3: Whether Intentions are Consistent with Reality (Num-
ber of Subjects)
When Intentions Don’t Match Reality.
Twenty one subjects had a disconnect between their stated inten-
tions for installing software updates and what the log data indicated
their computer was actually doing (Table 3).
For nine of these subjects, the computer ended up being less se-
cure than the subject intended. Three subjects intended to install
updates regularly and automatically, but actually had their auto-
matic updates turned off (or to notify) and had almost no updates
installed on their computer. The remaining six subjects all stated
that they intended to proactively install updates as soon as it was
convenient, but rarely actually got around to installing the updates
until the computer automatically did so. This mismatch between
intention and behavior led to the updates being installed, but left a
larger window of vulnerability than the subject intended.
As an example, Dan talked about how he chose when to install
updates:
If I were doing something fun I would interrupt it, no
problem. If I were just surfing the web, it’s like, oh,
whatever, I’ll update my computer. But if I’m writing
an email, if I’m working on a paper, if I’m working on
a homework assignment, then that usually takes prior-
ity. If I can put it off for 15, 20 minutes, I’ll just do
that later then, ’cause when I’m in the zone studying, I
don’t wanna be interrupted with anything.
This is a typical representation of a “convenient” intention: he
wanted to install updates, but didn’t want to be interrupted. So he
said he’d finish what he was doing and then install the updates.
However, Dan’s computer logs indicated that Windows Update au-
tomatically installed most updates; he rarely installed them man-
ually. This means that his computer was vulnerable for the maxi-
mum amount of time that Windows Update allows.
Twelve subjects had a disconnect between their stated intentions
and the log data that left their computer more secure than they had
intended. Two of these users explicitly stated that they wanted to
turn automatic updates off, but their computer still had the default
setting of automatically downloading and installing updates. An-
other example is a subject who wanted to continuously delay up-
dates, indefinitely, but had the default auto-update setting that au-
tomatically installed updates in a relatively timely fashion.
One subject from this group, James, expressed an intention to de-
lay updates until a convenient time, but always ended up interrupt-
ing what he was doing to manually install updates. He described
one instance that illustrated his intention to install when “conve-
nient”:
What was I gonna do? I was working on homework for
something and I was loading a video on my browser to
watch while I ate food. It was buffering and loading,
and I usually will take a meal break and watch a movie
at the same time. And I realized if I restarted, then that
would have to reload, the movie would have to reload
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all the way from the beginning. And I would lose that
time because I was going to eat in 15 or 20 minutes
and then I had to go somewhere, I had a class. So I
decided, you know what, I’ll just postpone.
However, according to James’s computer logs, all of the updates
on his computer were installed, and were installed manually in less
than 24 hours after being downloaded. James actually interrupted
his computer use at some point rather than postponing, and ended
up with a smaller window of vulnerability than he would have if he
had waited to install when convenient.
These disconnects are interesting when we look at what would
happen if we improved the usability of software updates and did
a better job of including the user in the loop. Nine of our sub-
jects’ computers would be more secure if they were able to execute
on their intentions, while twelve would be less secure. The sample
for this study is not representative, so we cannot claim that these 21
out of 37 subjects (59%) generalize to the larger population of com-
puter users. However, our sample has a relatively large number of
both people who would be more secure if usability improved, and
a similar number who would be less secure if usability improved.
We suspect that both groups are well-represented in the larger pop-
ulation.
When Intentions Match Reality.
Fourteen of our subjects were able to successfully execute on
their intentions: the log data from their computer was consistent
with these subjects’ stated intentions for software updates. How-
ever, these subjects had varying levels of security.
Eight subjects fell into the most secure category; these subjects
all had the default setting that automatically downloads and installs
updates. These subjects felt strongly that installing updates is im-
portant, and manually installed updates soon after they were no-
tified that the updates were available. These subjects didn’t wait
for the computer to automatically install the update. By manually
installing the update, they minimized the window of vulnerability.
Three subjects had a strong objection to the way that Windows
compels the computer to reboot; these subjects felt rebooting seri-
ously interrupted their work. These subjects changed their settings
so that Windows notified them that updates were available, but did
not download or install them. They manually downloaded and in-
stalled updates at a convenient time. Everyone in our study who
had changed their auto-update setting to Notify Before Download
or Notify Before Install fell into this group; people who change this
setting seemed to understand that updates are important and still
install them, but not as quickly.
Finally, three subjects didn’t feel like updates were that impor-
tant, and wanted to have the computer deal with the updates for
them. They continually postponed updates until the computer au-
tomatically installed the updates, and rebooted their computer.
Would Better Usability Be More Secure?.
Many people in the HCI community emphasize usability; if we
make computers easy to walk up and use, then people will be able
to accomplish more with them. When people form intentions about
what they want their computer to do, but cannot execute on those
intentions, HCI professionals naturally suspect a usability problem.
Indeed, Windows Update seems to have a usability issue; 21 of our
37 subjects (approximately 59%) were not able to use the system
the way they wanted to.
However, it isn’t clear whether better usability would actually be
an improvement in this case. Only 9 of 21 subjects whose behavior
did not match their intentions were less secure than they wanted to
be; these subjects would end up more secure if we were to improve
usability. But for the remaining 13 subjects whose behavior did not
match their intentions, the computer was more secure than it would
be if usability were improved. These subjects wanted to be less
secure, and poor usability was preventing them from executing on
that intention.
Many of our subjects had misunderstandings about what their
computer was doing with software updates. And many of our sub-
jects had trouble executing on their intentions. One reasonable as-
sumption is that the second statement — the difficulty in executing
on intentions — is caused by the first. However, we don’t believe
this is the case. A couple of subjects completely understood what
their computer was doing, but still could not execute on their in-
tentions. For example, Rachel understood that the computer was
installing updates, but felt like auto-updates were controlling her
and forcing her to install them. And there were many subjects
who didn’t understand what their computer was doing, but ended
up doing exactly what they wanted to. Brittany believed that her
computer only notified her but didn’t install updates; however, she
wanted to control her updates and ended up installing almost all of
her updates manually at convenient times. It seems that understand-
ing is not necessary to be able to execute on security intentions.
6. DISCUSSION
Our subjects had a number of misunderstandings about what
their computers were doing with respect to software updates. Also,
our subjects frequently were not able to execute on their intentions
about whether and when to install software updates. We specu-
late that these challenges may be the result of trying to remove the
human from security decisions. We also observe that improving
usability may actually backfire.
Learning Through Decisions.
In designing security technologies, there is a tension between
removing human decisions to automate security, and allowing the
user the flexibility to make important choices [5]. The current ver-
sion of Windows Update represents a compromise; most of the
decisions about updates are made by the computer, removing the
human from decision making. Many updates are downloaded and
installed automatically, and Windows eventually automatically in-
stalls all downloaded updates even when they require a reboot.
Some human decisions remain, particularly when they impact use
of the computer, such as rebooting.
Removing the human from decisions, however, seems to have
had an unintended side effect: users now find it difficult to under-
stand what the computer is doing, and to correctly implement their
part of the updates process. Having to make decisions as part of
a security mechanism helps the user to learn how that mechanism
works, what decisions are appropriate, and how to correctly execute
those decisions. This learning may be direct, coming from feed-
back within the system. Or, this learning may be indirect learning,
with the user seeking out the knowledge necessary to make better
decisions.
Windows Updates has successfully automated so many security
decisions that many users don’t learn how to make intelligent se-
curity decisions about software updates. Instead, they struggle at
understanding what their computer is doing, and often fail to exe-
cute even when they do make a decision.
This is important when some, but not all, security-relevant de-
cisions can be automated. Removing the user from most of the
decisions makes it more difficult for the user to intelligently make
the remaining decisions that cannot be fully automated.
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Designing Update Systems.
There is a fundamental tension here between learning and un-
derstanding what the computer is doing, and improving security by
forcing the user to behave securely. It isn’t clear which is a better
strategy. Consider just the results in this paper: if usability were
improved and users were able to accurately execute on their inten-
tions, some users would end up less secure but many would end up
more secure. The net effect on security isn’t clear; it is possible that
ignorance and inefficacy might be better for security than learning
and usability.
There is also a tension here among the users. Some users want
to trust the computer to make good decisions for them; that is, they
want the computer to be its own system administrator. For these
users, automating good decisions is valuable. However, other users
want control over their computer, and rebel against the feeling of
being forced into doing things they don’t agree with (or just haven’t
thought about).
The software industry is currently struggling with these tensions.
Windows update is clearly moving toward automating as much of
the software update process as possible. A wide variety of other
system applications are following. Firefox automatically down-
loads and installs updates with virtually no user intervention. Java
is moving toward automatically installing updates, and Adobe is
moving to a subscription model with automatically installed up-
dates and upgrades. Apple’s iOS 7 and OSX Mavericks now allow
users to turn on a setting to automatically install updates to all soft-
ware installed via the official App Stores.
However, some end-user “apps” and most business applications
are moving to a much more explicit, user-driven update model.
Some smartphones, for example, require the user to explicitly check
for updates and choose to install them. Timing of this install is im-
portant. If you must pick a single install time, Windows did well.
However, for any individual in a specific week, that time might
not always be convenient. Idle on a computer does not necessarily
mean convenient – it could be that users have important state that
would be lost if an update was installed or the computer rebooted.
A better strategy might be an adaptive mechanism that detects and
when the user is finishing their work for the night and provides a
notice at that time.
Almost all software on PCs eventually requires software updates,
and many of these updates are security relevant. Each software
vendor makes choices about how to distribute these updates. Our
results suggest that automating updates similar to Windows Update
or Firefox will lead to more uniform update installations, but will
also result in many users not understanding what is happening on
their computers and not being able to change things when they want
to. On the other hand, manually installing updates may lead to bet-
ter understanding about updates and greater feeling of control, but
will also likely result in lower levels of security and compliance.
7. CONCLUSION
Quickly installing software updates is one of the best ways to
protect your computer from malicious attackers. To improve secu-
rity, companies such as Microsoft have moved to a model of auto-
matic software updates that removes much of the decision-making
by the end user. Using a combination of interviews, a survey, and
log data, we compared what non-technical users understand about
what their computer is doing to install software updates, what they
want their computer to be doing, and what is actually happening on
the computer.
We found that many end users had misunderstandings about what
was happening on their computer; more than half our our subjects
didn’t correctly understand the automatic update settings on the
computer, and more than half of our subjects did not understand
when their updates were being installed. Furthermore, when users
decided how they wanted to manage software updates, they often
could not execute on that intention. This mismatch between inten-
tion and behavior frequently led to the computer being more se-
cure, but also frequently led to the computer being less secure than
intended.
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APPENDIX
A. SURVEY QUESTIONS
Q1: Suppose there is a lottery where you have a 10% chance of winning $1000. What is the largest amount you would be willing to pay for
a ticket in this lottery?
Q2: How do you see yourself: Are you in general a person who takes risk or do you try to evade risks? Please self-grade your choice (ranging
between 0-10)
( ) 0 – not at all prepared to take risk
( ) 1
( ) 2
( ) 3
( ) 4
( ) 5
( ) 6
( ) 7
( ) 8
( ) 9
( ) 10 – very much prepared to take risks
Q3: How familiar are you with the following terms? Please rate your familiarity with each term below from None (no understanding) to Full
(full understanding):
None Little Some Good Full
Security Update © © © © ©
Critical Update © © © © ©
Service Pack © © © © ©
Software Update © © © © ©
Optional Update © © © © ©
Hotfix © © © © ©
Upgrade © © © © ©
Q4a: Are you responsible for maintaining the laptop you brought with you today? Maintenance activities include things like installing and
updating software, running antivirus, dealing with problems that may arise, etc.
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Other
Q4b: Is there another person (or people) who helps with maintaining the laptop you brought with you today?
(Shown only if participant is responsible for maintaining their laptop.)
( ) No, I do it by myself
( ) Yes, I share the responsibility with someone else
( ) Yes, I ask for help occasionally from someone who knows more than I do
( ) Other (please specify)
Q5: Please list the other people who use this computer, by their first name only. If nobody else uses this computer, leave the box blank:
Q6: Which of the following types of software do you have installed on the laptop you brought with you? Please check all that apply:
[ ] Windows operating system
[ ] Microsoft Office
[ ] Anti-virus software
[ ] Virus definitions or data files for your anti-virus software
[ ] Firewall software
[ ] Web browser, like Chrome or Firefox
[ ] Internet security software
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[ ] Anti-spyware software
[ ] Adobe products, like Adobe Reader or Flash
[ ] Java
[ ] Database, like Oracle or Microsoft Access
[ ] Graphic design, like Photoshop
[ ] Multimedia, like iTunes, DVD player
[ ] Games
[ ] Communication, like Skype, Instant Message
[ ] Educational software
Q7b: Which of the following anti-virus programs do you have installed on your computer? Please check all that apply:
Only shown if the participant claimed to have an anti-virus installed.
[ ] Avast
[ ] AVG
[ ] Norton
[ ] McAfee
[ ] Microsoft
[ ] Kaspersky
[ ] I have an anti-virus program installed, but I don’t remember which one
[ ] Other (please specify)
Q8: How often do you remember seeing a notification on your computer that looks similar to the following image?
( ) Never
( ) Rarely
( ) Sometimes
( ) Often
( ) Very Often
Q9: How long has it been since the last time any software on the laptop you brought with you was updated?
( ) Less than one month
( ) A couple of months
( ) 6 months or so
( ) About a year
( ) 1-2 years
( ) Longer than 2 years
( ) I don’t know
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Q10: In what ways do you remember finding out that a software update is available? Please check all that apply:
[ ] Checking the website of the software company
[ ] Checking for updates using the software itself
[ ] Email notification
[ ] News article
[ ] Mentioned by a friend or family member
[ ] Mentioned by a work colleague
[ ] Automated message on your computer
[ ] Other (please specify)
Q11:
Some kinds of software can check for software updates and let the user know when an update is available. Other kinds will check and then
also download the update, so it is ready for the user to install. Still others automatically install software updates without any action by the
user.
For each of the following kinds of software you indicated above that you have installed on the laptop you brought with you today, please
indicate which kinds of software you remember behaving in the following ways:
CHECKING for updates automatically, and NOTIFYING you that new updates are available
CHECKING for and DOWNLOADING updates automatically, and NOTIFYING you that an update is ready to be installed
INSTALLING updates automatically, and NOTIFYING afterwards
INSTALLING updates automatically, WITHOUT notifying afterwards
If you aren’t sure, choose your best guess.
(Only software selected in Q6 was shown)
Checking,
Checking and Downloading and Installing and then Installing Without
Notifying Notifying Notifying Notifying
Windows operating system [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Microsoft Office [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Anti-virus software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Virus definitions or data files for your anti-virus software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Firewall software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Web browser, like Chrome or Firefox [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Internet security software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Anti-spyware software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Adobe products, like Adobe Reader or Flash [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Java [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Database, like Oracle or Microsoft Access [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Graphic design, like Photoshop [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Multimedia, like iTunes, DVD player [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Games [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Communication, like Skype, Instant Message [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Educational software [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Q12: Thinking about software installed on the laptop you brought with you that CHECKS for updates, NOTIFIES you that an update is
ready, but does NOT automatically install it, how long after being notified do you typically install the update?
(Only software selected in Q11 as Checking and Notifying was shown)
13
102 Tenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security USENIX Association
Right Away Later Never
Windows operating system ( ) ( ) ( )
Microsoft Office ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( )
Virus definitions or data files for your anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( )
Firewall software ( ) ( ) ( )
Web browser, like Chrome or Firefox ( ) ( ) ( )
Internet security software ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-spyware software ( ) ( ) ( )
Adobe products, like Adobe Reader or Flash ( ) ( ) ( )
Java ( ) ( ) ( )
Database, like Oracle or Microsoft Access ( ) ( ) ( )
Graphic design, like Photoshop ( ) ( ) ( )
Multimedia, like iTunes, DVD player ( ) ( ) ( )
Games ( ) ( ) ( )
Communication, like Skype, Instant Message ( ) ( ) ( )
Educational software ( ) ( ) ( )
Q13: Have you ever changed the settings for whether software automatically CHECKS for updates?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) I don’t know
Q14: Have you ever changed the settings for whether software updates are INSTALLED automatically?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) I don’t know
Q15: For each of the following types of software you have installed on the laptop you brought with you, how likely would you be to interrupt
whatever task you were using the software for, to install a security update? Please rate how likely you would be to to do this from Very
Unlikely to Very Likely:
(Only software selected in Q6 was shown)
Very Unlikely Unlikely Undecided Likely Very Likely
Windows operating system ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Microsoft Office ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Virus definitions or data files for your anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Firewall software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Web browser, like Chrome or Firefox ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Internet security software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-spyware software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Adobe products, like Adobe Reader or Flash ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Java ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Database, like Oracle or Microsoft Access ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Graphic design, like Photoshop ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Multimedia, like iTunes, DVD player ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Games ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Communication, like Skype, Instant Message ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Educational software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q16: For each of the following types of software you have installed on the laptop you brought with you, how willing would you be to
interrupt whatever task you were using the software for, to install OTHER, NON-security updates? Please rate how likely you would be to
to do this from Very Unlikely to Very Likely:
(Only software selected in Q6 was shown)
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Very Unlikely Unlikely Undecided Likely Very Likely
Windows operating system ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Microsoft Office ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Virus definitions or data files for your anti-virus software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Firewall software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Web browser, like Chrome or Firefox ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Internet security software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Anti-spyware software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Adobe products, like Adobe Reader or Flash ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Java ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Database, like Oracle or Microsoft Access ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Graphic design, like Photoshop ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Multimedia, like iTunes, DVD player ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Games ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Communication, like Skype, Instant Message ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Educational software ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q17: Which of these statements do you agree with the most? Please drag-and-drop the statements below to rank them according to your
level of agreement with each statement, from (1) Most Agreement to (5) Least Agreement:
1. Installing a software update repairs software (e.g., fixes bugs or malfunctions) and makes my computer more reliable.
2. Installing a software update improves software so that it works better and can do new things.
3. Installing a software update protects software so that it is less vulnerable.
4. Installing a software update is routine maintenance that keeps my computer in good working order.
5. Installing a software update keeps my computer “up to date” so it doesn’t fall behind or become obsolete as quickly.
Q18: Was it difficult for you to rank the statements?
( ) No
( ) Yes (Please explain)
Q19: How often have you experienced an update that caused your computer to stop working properly?
( ) Never
( ) Rarely
( ) Sometimes
( ) Often
( ) Very Often
Q20: How worried are you about updates causing your computer to stop working properly?
( ) Never thought about this before
( ) Not worried
( ) Slightly worried
( ) Worried
( ) Very worried
Q21: Have you ever had one of the following experiences? Please check all that apply:
[ ] Received a phishing message or other scam email
[ ] Warning in a web browser that says, “This site may harm your computer?”
[ ] Unwanted popup windows
[ ] Computer had a virus
[ ] Someone broke in or “hacked” the computer
[ ] Stranger used your credit card without your knowledge or permission
[ ] Identity theft more serious than use of your credit card number without permission
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Q22: How familiar are you with the following Internet-related terms? Please rate your familiarity with each term below from None (no
understanding) to Full (full understanding):
None Little Some Good Full
RSS ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Reload ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Widget ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Spyware ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Proxypod ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Tagging ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Cache ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Frames ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Newsgroup ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
PDF ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Torrent ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Malware ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Wiki ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Podcasting ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Favorites ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Blog ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q23: Have you ever worked in a “high tech” job such as computer programming, IT, or computer networking?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Other (please specify)
Q24: How old are you? Please type your answer here:
Q25: What is the last grade or class you completed in school?
( ) None, or grades 1-8
( ) High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
( ) High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
( ) Technical, trade or vocational school AFTER high school
( ) Some college, no 4-year degree (includes associate degree)
( ) College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)
( ) Post-graduate training/professional school after college (toward a Masters/Ph.D., Law or Medical school)
( ) Post-graduate degree (Masters/Ph.D., Law or Medical school)
( ) I don’t know
( ) Other (please specify)
Q26: What is your gender?
( ) Man
( ) Woman
( ) Prefer not to answer
Q26: What is your race?
( ) American Indian or Alaska Native
( ) Asian or Pacific Islander
( ) Black or African-American
( ) Hispanic or Latino
( ) White
( ) Other (please specify)
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